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infinite potentialities of religious experience and ecstasy. Their god is within them. The lives of such as they constitute a glaring refutation of Durkheim's theory.⁸

Our critique is drawing to a close. The arguments advanced seem to show that Durkheim's theory of religion does not bear out the expectations aroused by the wisdom, scholarship, and noted brilliancy of the author. Durkheim errs in denying the savage the ability to differentiate between the natural and the supernatural, and in denying nature the power to cause the religious thrill; he errs in accepting a mongrel definition of religion and in regarding the dichotomy of experience into sacred and profane as a psychologically univocal determination of all religion; he errs in identifying primitive religion with totemism and the "totemic principle" with *mana*; he errs, finally, in claiming for *mana*, and its emotional concomitant, the religious thrill, an exclusively crowd-psychological origin.

Thus Durkheim does not succeed in furnishing a satisfactory solution of either of the two problems which stand in the center of his interest: the relation of individual to social experience and the interpretation of the nature and origin of the religious sentiment. Sharp as is the author's wit and brilliant as is his argumentation, one closes the book with a melancholy assurance that Durkheim has left these two perennial problems where he found them.

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THE REVIVAL OF THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

NOTWITHSTANDING the fact that as staunch a defender of demonstrative theism as Professor Flint found himself constrained to say that "theism, according to the view now expressed, is not vitally interested in the fate of the so-called ontological argument,"¹ we find the argument receiving serious attention in recent suggestive contributions to the philosophy of religion, though from widely differing points of view.² Dr. Galloway, following Lotze, sees

⁸ It may be of interest to add here that Durkheim uses his sociologically derived religious concepts as stepping stones toward a similar derivation of the fundamental categories of human thought. The theme is broached repeatedly in the author's study, but nowhere is it treated with any degree of fullness. One rather anticipates a future elaborate work on the subject. Hence a criticism at this time would perhaps be premature as well as unfair. Cf., however, the writer's remarks in a review of Durkheim's book, *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 17, 1915, pp. 731-733.

¹ *Theism*, p. 267.

² George Galloway, *The Philosophy of Religion*, New York, 1914. W. E. Hocking, *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*, New Haven, 1911. Georg Wobbermin, *Der christliche Gottesglaube*, Leipzig, 1911.

the source of the vitality of the ontological argument in the "rooted disinclination of the human spirit to believe that the supreme being, who is the supreme value, is only a fiction of the mind."³ The nerve of the argument, he thinks, is found in the fact that we feel impelled to ascribe reality to that which is made the object of religious faith. To believe in values which are felt to be illusory would be a self-stultification. For Professor Wobbermin who, with Tolstoi, sees in religion the only escape from the alternatives of *tierische Stumpfheit oder Selbstmord*,⁴ the ontological argument, like all religious phenomena, is but an expression of the eternal Yea of human life. The logical cogency of the ontological or other theistic arguments is not of primary concern. The ultimate problem is "whence the idea of God itself? Yea, rather, whence the mere possibility of this idea" (p. 113)? No rational interpretation of sense-data suffices to explain its *raison d'être*, no philosophy of society. Its origin is to be sought in fundamental human needs. The will to believe is but a phase of the will to live.

Dr. Galloway and Professor Wobbermin subordinate the argument to emotional and volitional needs. For Professor Hocking, however, it is the most compelling of all proofs for God's existence. It is in fact the only argument "which is wholly faithful to the history, the anthropology, of religion. It is the only proof of God."⁵ The chapter on the ontological argument forms in a way the climax of his most stimulating book. With the validity of his interpretation of the ontological argument stands or falls his system of philosophy. The version presented by Professor Hocking is not essentially new; it has been advanced in one form or another by Pfeleiderer and other Hegelians. It seems, however, entitled to serious consideration since the author has brought to its support a wide acquaintance with the history and psychology of religion, keen powers of analysis, and a profound insight into the metaphysical implications of religious experience.

My apologies are due Professor Hocking if occasionally I have missed his thought. In spite of great vigor of style and wealth of illustrations one detects at times a certain academic fondness for subtlety of phraseology. This when combined with his fundamentally mystical point of view and the composite nature of his philosophy makes it very difficult at times to follow his argument. The "candid-humble philosopher," to whom Professor Hocking alludes, is perplexed when told that his soul may be filled with a "trooping invasion of the concrete fullness of eternity" (p. 106) or when it is suggested that he "take experience breast-forwardly, oriented by the

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 387.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 118.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 307.

universal or common eye which the fundamental God-consciousness gives" (p. 296). It must be confessed that such Jovian utterances are more interesting than illuminating.

"The object of certain knowledge," says Professor Hocking, "has this threefold structure, self, nature, and other mind; and God, the appropriate object of ontological proof, includes these three" (p. 315). His philosophy, then, may be visualized under the form of a triangular pyramid, the base being composed of self, society, and nature, while God or the absolute other forms the apex. The God-idea is therefore fundamental for his entire philosophy. God is the *fons et origo* of all knowledge of self, of society, and of nature; He is the absolute other, the ultimate reality. God is the presupposition of self-consciousness and appears in "the abiding sense of what stability and certainty we have as we move about among men and things" (p. 295); God is "present in all experience as that by which I too may firmly conceive that experience from the outside" (p. 224). Nature with her laws, her activity, her permanency, is "held empirically in place by the active decisiveness of outer reality" (p. 287). It is only through a "prior recognition of other mind that my physical experience acquires objectivity at all" (p. 288). A knowledge of the absolute other is also a prerequisite to a knowledge of other selves. "It is through the knowledge of God that I am able to know men; not first through the knowledge of men that I am able to know or imagine God" (p. 298). In fine, "God is known as that of which I am primarily certain; and being certain, am certain of self and of my world of men and men's objects" (p. 296).

The starting-point of Professor Hocking's thought, therefore, is the contention of the ontological argument that the idea of God implies his reality. But the "leap from idea to reality" is not made, after the fashion of Anselm and Descartes, on the basis of the sheer logical perfection of the idea itself. The implications of the experience in which the idea functions are made to point to something more than "mere idea." The absolute other or God in the form of otherness is a necessary element in all experience. This *social* element, the fact that "man knows well that he is not alone," is an irreducible factor in all experience; "nor does this social experience ever arise." When the individual becomes self-conscious he finds the alter-pole firmly established as a constituent element in the self. The idea of the absolute other or God is therefore a necessary inference from experience. "But in finding God as a necessary object of experience, have we not, in a way sufficient and decisive, proved his existence" (p. 302)? The old deductive statement of the argument was "I have an idea of God, therefore God exists." We are nearer the truth, thinks Professor Hocking, when we say, "I have an idea of God, therefore I have an experience of God" (p. 314). It follows from this that

“reality can only be proved by the ontological argument; and conversely, the ontological argument can only be applied to reality” (*ibid*).

Professor Hocking thus plants himself squarely upon a mystical and empirical basis; his restatement of the old argument, therefore, has a realistic note that is particularly refreshing. Men have vainly sought God through the refinements of logic, but as thought progresses he becomes more impersonal, more evanescent. In reality God is nigh to all, closer than breathing, nearer than thought. This mystical note we often find warring with the author's keen intellectualism. He confesses that this “intellectual business is . . . an eminently dust-raising pursuit.” Hence the rather damaging admission that “intellectual advance must always involve loss to religion.” The grasp of God which the child has in “solid proportions” is lost “amid the bustle of scientific labor: it needs in a measure to be looked away to; it is best found in the pauses of the weaving process, a matter for the most part of holiday survey” (pp. 98 ff). It is the old cry of the mystic who finds his God in the loneliness of the monk's cell, in the isolation of the mountain top, in the child's simple fancy or in the intuitions of the philosopher. In every case God is most in evidence in the margin of things, in the eddies of existence, remote from the swift strong tide of life.

Professor Hocking's statement of the ontological argument presupposes an idealistic metaphysics. In fact, almost every form of idealism has been utilized in this work.⁶ Subjective idealism of the Berkeleyan type is the immediate result of identifying idea with reality. To be sure we are told that “we can not think of any idea that is not an idea of some thing.” We get the impression that ideas are set over against things (p. 79). But this very thing-ness of nature, the “objectivity” and literalness of sensation, is not due to physical reality; it is the “unmistakable aspect of other mind” (p. 284). A sort of mystical idealism is then called upon to bridge the gap between the objective idealism which makes nature the manifestation of other mind and the subjective idealism which finds God in the idea only. For “no form of the argument can be valid which finds God at the level of thought only, and not at the level of sensation” (p. 313). The fact that nature depends for its “objectivity” upon other mind is not an inference, but “an immediate experience.” “I do not first know my physical world as a world of *objects* and then as a world of *shared* objects: it is through a prior recognition of the presence of other mind that my physical experience acquires objectivity at all” (p. 288). The “total world-fact” of men and things is potentially present in my whole-idea and depends for its reality upon

⁶ Consult D. C. Macintosh, *The Problem of Knowledge*, pp. 161-180, for a more detailed analysis, also *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXIII., pp. 27-47.

this idea. "My real must already be given in order that my idea may be found real." That is, "if my idea of God is real, it is real in experience" (p. 313).

In spite of its initial realistic note Professor Hocking's development of the ontological argument reveals a pronounced *a priorism*. He speaks of a "universal and primordial knowledge" of God which all men share, a "universal revelation" (p. 230). All the criteria by which we know other minds "suppose the minds to be furnished in advance with the *idea* of an other mind" (p. 250). This *a priori* content of experience presents two aspects which are ultimately the same, namely, the *logical* and the *social*. If we look at this "universal and primordial" God-idea from the point of view of its origin and setting we discover that the original source of the knowledge of God is an experience which might be described as a feeling of "*not being alone in knowing the world*" (p. 236). God in this sense is the great socius, the infinite other, the awareness of whom is the necessary condition of the understanding of all social experiences. This awareness of the infinite socius emerges in contact with nature as well as society, but "we can not keep them apart nor assign to either a priority over the other" (p. 231). Social experience only becomes religious "when it is at the same time an experience of nature power" (p. 232). All unconsciously, perhaps, Professor Hocking even ascribes to nature the chief rôle as the medium through which the idea of the infinite other finds expression. Nature furnishes through her "impressive objective facts" (p. 302) a "literalness" a permanent setting not found in the changing social order. "Nature, pungent and intense with sensation, is an integral part of the knowledge of another mind" and for this reason nature provides "the very foundations of personality" (p. 261). It is undoubtedly the realistic strain in Professor Hocking's thought that has influenced him to give nature the leading part in the mediation of the knowledge of the infinite other. "Through no historical retracings," however, "shall we discover the silent entrance into nature" of the infinite other. The problem is ultimately one of the content of consciousness itself, of the intuitive insight of the mystic.

In support of the reality of this infinite other Professor Hocking makes skilful use of the metaphysical implications of social experience. He bases his inference as to the existence of God upon an implication of the psychology of the self. In the element of *otherness*, the alter-pole of the self and an irreducible factor in all consciousness, he finds indisputable evidence for the factual existence of God. The leap from the fact of otherness in experience to the infinite other involves at least two assumptions. It implies first that the idea of an infinite other is a legitimate inference from social experience and secondly that we have immediate or intuitive knowledge of this

infinite other. The latter contention is the one of primary interest for Professor Hocking. He is tireless in his insistence upon the immediacy of our knowledge of the absolute other; "my idea of other mind is at the same time an experience of other mind" (p. 278). He insists that this idea of other mind is the logical prius of any experience, intuitive or otherwise, that we may have of other mind, although the psychological analysis of mystical experiences seems to show that they are not the source of new truth, but merely re-evaluate existing contents of knowledge.

Is the idea of an infinite other, however, a legitimate inference from social experience? Baldwin, Royce, McDougall and others have familiarized us with the fact that all experience is in a sense social experience. The ego and the alter arise and develop together as constituent elements of the self. My own individual self is composed of "social copy" which I take over imitatively from my fellows and build into the fabric of my personality. Not only the content, but also the orientation of the growing self, its measure of values, its ends to be striven for, are derived largely from others. What is now part of myself was originally part of other-self. All that I hope to become is largely my thought of others as so many possible ways of attaining self-realization. Society and the race are in this sense the socius, the total other, by which my life is shaped, interpreted, evaluated. But no amount of emphasis of the immediacy of the alter-phase of experience, of its "primordial and universal" nature, of its necessary and determinative function, can justify us in reifying and making it identical with the absolute other or God. It may very well be true that the idea of God implies some sort of a social order, but it can not be said that the existence of God is a necessary implication of social experience. We can easily imagine a social order composed of finite selves, in which all the implications of otherness for the reality of my own experiences and of nature would be satisfied. A godless world does not necessarily cease to be a social or a real world, though it may be poverty-stricken.

We are reminded of Kant's dogmatism as to the *a priori* forms of knowledge when Professor Hocking tells us that all the various kinds of social experience "suppose the mind to be furnished in advance with an *idea* of an other mind" (p. 250). Such an *a priori* explanation of the origin of the God-idea is opposed by the facts of genetic psychology and comparative religion. The God-idea is not primary. It is derived. We are to see in it not the *primum mobile* of our thought, but an effect of the force that has created thought. Man from the very dawn of religious consciousness has been interested not in the idea of God, but in the satisfaction of inner motives and needs of which that idea is an expression. Man is not a born manipulator of abstract concepts and is only driven to abstract thought by

the dire necessities of existence. The need for rationalization itself could not be felt until after a long and slow accumulation of experience. It may be that the idea of an absolute other is a latent mental possibility for child or savage, but it will always remain latent until a richer social setting and the consequent expansion of the self present the problem in the attempted solution of which the idea is born. As Hegel observes, it is at twilight that the owl of Minerva takes its flight. The philosophers and theologians with their absolute others and ontological speculations only arrive after the creative religious *élan* has done its work.

But this "universal and primordial" God-idea has its logical as well as its social implications. Professor Hocking contends that it functions from the beginning of experience as the whole-idea or "germ-cell" of knowledge (p. 95), our fundamental intellectual instrument. The God-idea is man's "explorative idea" (p. 327). It is his measure of values. An object is real directly in proportion to the extent to which the whole-idea enters into it (p. 130). Knowledge grows only in the "mid-world" between the self and the changeless absolute, grows by faithfully reproducing the eternal pattern of the whole, "the simple-total frame of things" which is "huge, inevitable, abiding." This whole-idea is related to other ideas as "permanent subject" to "possible predicates." The whole-idea abides while its predicates shift in kaleidoscopic fashion. The landscape of knowledge varies, but the sky-line is eternally the same.

Professor Hocking contends that in the whole-idea which is a universal and primordial fact of consciousness, we not only envisage reality in its entirety, but we are immediately aware of its existence. Here, as in the case of the absolute other, we must examine the logical content and the cognitive significance of the whole-idea before we can entertain the mystic's claim that through this idea he gains an immediate experience of reality as a whole. Professor Hocking in his eagerness to emphasize the immediacy of experience is in danger of overlooking the psychological and epistemological difficulties of his problem. The contention that the child's knowledge begins with the idea of reality as a whole (p. 95) is misleading. Is the whole-idea of the child simply his vague awareness of experience as a whole; is it his limited whole-idea plus the possible modifications of that idea by later experience; or is it the highly abstract whole-idea of the absolute idealist read into the undeveloped consciousness of the child? Does the child start life with the subtle and finished product of the metaphysician's brain or do the forms of his thought, such as wholeness, identity, unity, causation, and the like gradually take definite shape through his contact with men and things? Granting that the crude whole-idea is present at the beginning of experience, can we say that the child or the man for that matter has one whole-idea *par*

excellence? Is not every whole-idea relative and do not its use and validity depend upon its being restricted to a definite context of experience? The child instead of having only one has many whole-ideas and they are constantly changing. We can only capitalize one form of thought such as wholeness or causation or substance and make that the measure of all reality by forfeiting the richness and fullness of reality itself.

Professor Hocking's contention as to the "primordial" character of the whole-idea, its transcendent importance as forming the beginning and setting the goal for all knowledge, its immediate witness to reality as a whole, is strangely inconsistent with the statement that it "has its vicissitudes, its fortune to make and ever to re-make, its frequent seeming life and death struggles" (p. 99). How are we to explain these vicissitudes? If these struggles are only apparent and touch not the integrity of absolute reality that pursues its course with metaphysical serenity, fancy free, then after all are we not living in a Plato's cave, the dupes of dancing shadows? If on the other hand the "life and death struggles" of metaphysical systems are actual reflections in our thought-life of the diversity and contrariety of reality itself may we not, in Professor Hocking's own words, characterize his praise of the charms of his sphinx-like absolute other as "a surfeited agglomerate of laudatory epithets"?

Professor Hocking's reply to these animadversions would probably be "none of these things moves me." He will contend doubtless that the citadel of his position has not yet been taken, namely, the immediate awareness of God's reality gained through mystical intuition. Professor Hocking is continually pushing back this intuitive knowledge of God's existence to the beginnings of experience; "the primary object of acquaintance for any finite knower is his environment of *other mind*" (p. 254). Yet it is not a question even in his own mind of the priority in time or of the function of the God-idea in the mental development either of the individual or of the race. Primarily it is a question of the intimacy and the immediacy of the experience of the God-idea itself. "In any sense in which I can imagine, or think, or conceive an experience of other mind, in that same sense I *have* an experience of other mind, apart from which I should have no such idea" (p. 274). The idea carries with it its immediate witness to the reality of the religious object. This feeling of reality, being the pre-condition of all experience and all knowledge, can not be repudiated. It would be equivalent to the repudiation of the immediate witness of the senses to the reality of the sense-object.

Professor Hocking's analysis of the ontological argument finally resolves itself then into the question of the cognitive value of the mystical experience. He has carefully laid the basis for his fundamental thesis in his interpretation of feeling. "Cognizance and feel-

ing are but different stages of the *same thing*" (p. 68). "Religious feeling . . . like other feeling, is all idea-material, idea-activity" (p. 73). Feeling, in other words, is but inarticulate idea and vanishes with the complete rationalization of the situation. Through this identification of feeling with idea it becomes possible to claim the immediacy and finality of feeling as evidence of a cognitive content and at the same time to explain the vagueness of that content on the ground of incomplete rationalization. No such confusing of the rôles of thought and feeling, however, can ever justify the contention that feeling gives us ontological information. The examination of mystical experiences seems to show that the mystic brings his philosophical or theological ideas to the situation. They may undergo complete re-interpretation, but there is no contribution to their cognitive content. Saint Theresa, who fell into a trance while puzzling over the Trinity, had all doubts dispelled, but her theological ideas were not altered by the emotional experience.

Professor Hocking has not escaped the weaknesses that beset the mystic, notwithstanding that fact that he warns against them (pp 352 ff.). Like all mystics, he seems unaware that in describing the content of the God-idea he is using thoroughly conventional and traditional terms. He finds the God-idea in the "abiding sense of what stability and certainty we have, as we move about among men and things" (p. 295). Again, God is "my persistent sense of reality," or my feeling of "responsibility and dependence." It is still further in evidence when I realize that "what creativity I have and must have is built upon a continuous docility" (p. 296). He confesses that anything new or unique in this knowledge is not "conspicuous in experience," and "as permanent knowledge, with which we forever begin, and *with* which we forever think our world, we shall not expect it to be conspicuous" (p. 295). Is this not, however, a practical acknowledgment that nothing original or characteristic is revealed in our actual experience of the God-idea? Furthermore, Professor Hocking's own phraseology seems to indicate that it is the emotional accompaniment rather than the ideational element which is of primary interest to him. When he speaks of a vision that admits into the soul "some trooping invasion of the concrete fullness of eternity" or when he describes the felt presence of God as "my disposition to take experience with *full empirical openness*, breast-forwardly, oriented by the universal or common eye which the fundamental God-consciousness gives me" the ideational content of such language is almost ridiculous in its obscurity, its swirling toploftiness. But viewed as a vehicle for the expression of the emotional life this very vagueness is justifiable, even necessary. We must insist, however, that the mystic do not confuse the emotional satisfactions of his mystical experience with the logically compelling nature of its

ideational framework. If we wish to get the most out of Wordsworth's *Intimations of Immortality* we must recognize that it is poetry, not science or philosophy.

Professor Hocking's emphasis of mystical intuition subjects him to a more serious criticism, namely, that he has neglected the part that man plays in shaping his religious ideas. We are told that nature as the objective manifestation of the absolute other first aroused the God-idea in man. But man in passive contact with an objective world would never become a religious being. It was only when man began to *humanize* these contacts with nature, when he built for himself altars, carved for himself images and cried "these be thy gods, O Israel," that religion was born. Man did not create all the elements in the problem of existence, but the statements of that problem and the attempts at a solution are his work. Man's God-idea is but a proposed solution of one phase of the problem of existence. Instead, therefore, of having one "universal and primordial," God-idea, we have an endless sequence of deities, a *Geburt der Götter*, followed by the inevitable *Götterdämmerung*. So far as human experience goes the vitality of these god-ideas is not traceable to an aboriginal God-idea of which they are imperfect replicas, but to the fact that somewhere and at some time, either past or present, groups of men with loyal hearts addressed their gods as "*our* God whom *we* serve." Each age creates its God-idea. In a world "strewn with dead gods" it is not a question as to the ability to intuit mystically a changeless absolute; it is a question of re-evaluation in terms of accumulated experiences. Should man ever lose this need and this capacity for re-evaluating and reformulating his religious ideas religion itself would cease to be. A God who is taken over bodily with all qualities unchanged from another age has already entered upon the period of senescence and the creed that claims to give an infallible enumeration of these qualities has thereby forfeited its claim upon our intellectual allegiance.

The absolute other of Professor Hocking is a brilliant idealization of the socius phase of the mystical religious experience. His infinite other differs, to be sure, from the absolute of Plotinus, of Spinoza, or of Hegel, but those differences are a fairly accurate measure of the widening and deepening of human experience which the centuries have brought. Each thinker has given us his interpretation of the absolute, the infinite socius, which the mystic consciousness of his age demanded; but in each case it is an idealized self, the "permanent Me which I seek." Hence the note of intimacy and of immediacy which Professor Hocking thinks proves the reality of the absolute other, the "objectivity" of God. The finite socius projects into the absolute socius its own feelings, its particular social situations, its scientific terminology, its modern values. The finite socius

demands a sympathetic background for its feeble strivings. "The small launches of postulation which we make depend on being quickly caught up and floated by a tide of corroboration hailing from beyond ourselves" (p. 153). The authority of the absolute is therefore really self-authority; to obey the great socius is to obey my better self. In him the self literally lives and moves and has its being. The mystic's at-home-ness with his absolute is due to an actual at-one-ness based on no metaphysical illusion, but upon psychological facts.

The mystical note is always present where there is a suggestion of the unknown, of uncharted reality, of infinite otherness and the like. This uncharted reality represents limitless possibilities for self-expansion, creativity, spontaneity, in a word for *the fullness of life*. The very existence of this reality is potential, contingent in a measure at least upon the expansive powers of the self. The mystical content of the Christian's God and also his reality are measured in terms of the potentialities he offers for self-perfection: "Be ye perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect." The deity of Augustine or of Spinoza was conceived in terms of the exhaustless possibilities he offered for flights of the speculative imagination or for an eternity of intellectual appropriation of his truth and beauty. It may be seriously doubted whether any other form of reality can ever be attributed to God except that which is measured in terms of the creativity and the resulting expansion of the self which he elicits. Professor Hocking's infinite other is essentially a mystical attribution of reality to the background of the self, to the marginal region of social experience in the interest of that unfolding social experience itself. The reality of his infinite other is exhausted largely in the richer *mise en scène* provided for the drama of human life. For certain types of religious imagination this rich setting of spiritual forces and spiritual potentialities is absolutely necessary. "This is the victory that overcomes the world, even your faith."

Herein lies the pragmatic justification of mysticism and the mystical temperament with its valuable contributions to the religious life. For this reason also the mystic may be pardoned the ineffable assurance with which he asserts the reality of this realm of overlapping things, though a cold psychological analysis of the "objectivity" of his infinite other may reveal only the existence of stubborn temperamental needs which demand a larger freer air for the full and sympathetic unfolding of the spiritual life. For the mystic a world without an absolute other is an immoral world. The God, says Professor Hocking, "who merely is, as our absolute other, is by that fact both promotive of our weal and of our morality." God's ability to embody the absolute moral ideal is conditioned upon his "standing outside the arena of human effort with its contrasts of good and evil"

(p. 331). To make him party to the strife would strip him of the charm and inspirational power of his mystical, infinite otherness. Nietzsche, to be sure, expressed compassion for the God who is not allowed to sin. But Nietzsche would hardly have done so had he not missed the mystical appeal of an absolute other who lies *jenseits von Gut und Böse*. James's democratic temperament also reacted against such a God because he is too much of a "gentleman." But the mystic's God is essentially a "gentleman" and an aristocrat. His infinite otherness would not allow him to play any other part in the drama of the universe. We may pity his dignified helplessness, but his immaculate aloofness at least preserves him from all contamination. He offers man an escape from the pettiness and the nagging limitations of existence. Universality, finality, in a word the *indefeasible*, are not these parts of the ideal? Is it not true, *was sich nie und nirgends hat begeben das allein veraltet nie?* Or is this merely a bit of cleverly devised self-deception? Some of the finest expressions of religious genius are born apparently of the grim determination not to acknowledge the essential limitations of humanity.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

Modern Philosophers and Lectures on Bergson. HARALD HÖFFDING.
Tr. by ALFRED C. MASON. London and New York: Macmillan and Company. 1915. Pp. xii + 317.

Professor Höffding's *Modern Philosophers* aims to introduce its readers to the world of contemporary thought by setting before them the views of eighteen eminent thinkers whose chief works fall in the period of the past thirty-six years. Wundt, Ardigó, Bradley, Taine, Renan, Fouillée, Renouvier, Boutroux, Clerk Maxwell, Mach, Hertz, Ostwald, Avenarius, Guyau, Nietzsche, Eucken, and William James, figure in the list, as well as Bergson, to whom a relatively considerable space is allotted. Approximately in so far as it would be possible to compass an adequate and delicate discussion of eighteen philosophies in the space of three hundred pages Professor Höffding has accomplished this task. His subjects are reduced to a common denominator of generality rather broad; but on the other hand this generality is redeemed by Professor Höffding's talent of exposition, by his erudition, by his long-practised faculty of insight, and by the admirable temper of his writing, a temper that is affable, genial, and serene.